It is such exclusionary discourse that has captured attention of Australian historians of the politics of 1888. Parkes' speech in the midst of the crisis over the Chinese passengers demands attention for its expression of a racialist ideology that is reproduced time and again in the development and legacy of the White Australia Policy. But the history of the White Australia Policy is not only a history of the politics of racialist ideologies and exclusion. It is also a history of law and government, one that has been captive in the historiography to the politics of race. Symptomatic is the writing on the subject of this paper, the late colonial legal contests over the scope of immigration restriction. The most attentive to legal events was Willard's first and influential history of the White Australia Policy, originally published in 1923.
6 Willard nevertheless paid little
The legal historiography of immigration law and the White Australia Policy might be expected to pay some attention to these late colonial cases, but the focus is on post-Federation statutory invention and the associated case law.
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The specialists in legal history report regularly the importance of the Victorian passengers; none were cleared for landing. The vessel was allowed to unload its cargo, but then placed in quarantine pending a decision of government on the fate of the passengers. The vessel's movements were documented in great detail in the Melbourne press and helped bring a simmering anti-Chinese agitation to a boil. When another inter-colonial vessel, the Burrumbeet, arrived a couple of days later carrying 14 Chinese passengers who had boarded at Sydney, the agitation intensified. The Burrumbeet was also placed in quarantine pending the government's decision on its passengers. 33 When the Afghan proceeded to Sydney a few days later an even more ferocious public response at that port resulted in a precipitate decision by the Premier Sir Henry Parkes to refuse landing rights to any of the passengers on any vessels arriving at Sydney, even including those holding naturalisation papers or prepared to pay the poll-tax.
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The decisions of both governments quickly became an international issue, with the Chinese Ambassador in Britain complaining that the colonial governments had breached international treaties, the law of nations and even their own laws.
There followed an intensive diplomatic correspondence over the next two months as the Colonial and Foreign Offices sought to mollify the Chinese government while largely acceding to the increasingly intransigent colonial governments.
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From the start of these events, in the face of the popular agitation and government action that threatened all Chinese landing rights, leading members of the Chinese community explored their options. In both Melbourne and Sydney, the merchants had long approached political hostility with the tools that it may be necessary in the existing circumstances of the present day to exercise this power in Victoria at any moment.
For Higinbotham, the court was in no position to question the government's discharge of its constitutional function ('a function, I will repeat, the exercise of which this court has no jurisdiction to review or to question') The exercise of that function in this case had been 'the opinion and determination that it was necessary for the public peace that no further Chinese other than British subjects should be permitted to land in Victoria'.
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The Chief Justice however was unable to persuade four of his colleagues of this view, which was shared only by Justice Kerferd, who tellingly was a former attorney-general and briefly premier (1874-5) of the colony. 46 Likewise, where Kerferd, and with him Higinbotham, dismissed the idea that the Chinese immigration statutes constituted a kind of invitation to immigrants, requiring them only to meet certain contractual commitments, the majority judges insisted that meeting the requirement to pay a poll-tax to the captain of the Afghan did indeed give Toy rights which could not be over-ridden by an erroneous claim of the colonial government that it had power to exclude aliens.
Finding comfort in the approach of the minority, however, with its powerful claim for the powers of a colonial government, the Victorian government subsequently appealed the Full Court's decision to the Privy Council in London. validity, although one of the three judges was of a mind to agree that they did. decrees and judgements of the court. The constitution cast this duty upon the executive and never before in the history of any British community, so far as our knowledge extends, has this second step been disregarded.
While Parkes invoked the dangers to peace and good order that would flow from the Chinese invasion, Darley saw a greater threat arising from the government's indifference to court decisions.
The danger of the course here pursued is obvious. We say nothing of the evil example set to the weak and thoughtless in the community, pernicious as this in itself is. If the court has once held that a certain class of persons are illegally imprisoned, the danger of holding others who fall exactly within the same class in illegal custody is extreme.
The government was forced to give way.
64
Inevitably, given the political mood of the time, the legal victory proved shortlived. The 1888 legal contests asserted Chinese entitlements to be heard in colonial courts and be treated equitably. Politically the threat of legal action, well-funded as it was in both Sydney and Melbourne, proved a potent weapon.
In Melbourne too writs of habeas corpus were sought when the government detained passengers on the Burrumbeet who had boarded at Sydney; the writs were withdrawn after the Victorian government gave way on the landing rights of the passengers who had paid the poll-tax. The Chinese litigation of 1888 was made possible by the wealth and resourcefulness of a Chinese community even in the face of unprecedented political hostility. The litigation also exposed fractures in the colonial constitutional order and differences within its leading ranks. Those differences spoke to the complexity of the issues, a fact illustrated in contemporary writing by legal authorities responding to the questions thrown up by colonial responses to aliens. 68 Law turned out to be a weapon that could used politically with considerable effect, by more than one side, in a contest of rights and interests.
The Chinese cases of 1888 exhibited the working of colonial law and politics across a number of dimensions.
In part, notably with respect to the NSW actions and their consequences, the story told here is one that both exemplifies and qualifies for this part of the Empire the longer history of habeas corpus as Paul Halliday has recounted itthe progressive winding back of its scope by the constraining effects on the one hand of codifying the writ, and on the other by legislative power providing sufficient authority for detention (and thus a successful return to the writ wherever it was served)
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. The success of the NSW cases, and the threat of the use of habeas corpus in Victorian contexts that may have played a role in freeing the passengers on the Burrumbeet, suggests the continuing viability of such ancient legal remedies in colonial contexts.
There are other dimensions however -the cases are important moments in late colonial debates about self-government, about the rights of aliens in British law, and about the notions of British subjecthood and its deployment by naturalised subjects at this time and later. In the longer history the cases also find their echo in the law and politics of immigration policy and practice in Australia.
The most important reported judgments in these cases distributed themselves Victoria' as he put it, had exercised a power to exclude aliens as part of a responsibility for securing the public peace and safety. His example of the potential threat of convicts from New Caledonia made it clear that the security threats being imagined were not simply racial. Windeyer joined with Chief Justice Darley in being unable to agree that colonial government could assert a power to exclude aliens without the consent of the imperial crown. When government counsel attempted to argue that the court had no jurisdiction since the matter was one of international law, the Chinese litigants being subjects of the Chinese emperor, the NSW judges insisted that the common law still applied to them, since they were detained on a British ship in a colonial harbour.
Against the evidence of an increasing statutory control over the status of aliens and foreigners, Darley in particular emphasised the particular conditions of war that had produced the alien statutes and inferred from this the limits of their application in local conditions. The texture of these leading judgments deserves an attention in Australian historiography that they have not received.
In asserting their legal subjectivity the Chinese litigants ran against the political tide turning against them, and challenged those in the judiciary who could not contemplate the entitlements of aliens, even alien friends, to take action in British courts. But the Victorian judges in the majority in favour of Toy, like the NSW judges in the habeas corpus cases, explored the possibilities that British justice was more characterised by its openness to all those wishing to test its boundaries than by the narrowing confines implicit in Higinbotham's judgment, with its over-riding deference to the authority of the legislature crowding out any privileging of the status of persons seeking the protection of the courts.
Such expansions and contractions of the legal spaces of the colonial court-room are remarkably reminiscent of more recent contests between government and judiciary over the status of non-citizens in Australian courts. 70 We cannot read these judgments as reflecting a particular sympathy with Chinese colonials so much expressing these judges' immersion in the traditions of the common law. of the Pacific we may be led to the view that the hardening of borders in the late nineteenth century was provoked by the success of Chinese litigants in using the local courts to assert their legal rights. The fact that some of these actions were frequently launched from on board vessels aggravated the jurisdictional contests that enlivened these proceedings and judgment. In the readiness with which many in the judiciary heard such litigants we see the grounds for a longer term emergence of immigration law grounded in ever more elaborate categories of personhood and of jurisdiction.
